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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a recent cellular network 
connection paradigm, known as a user-provided network (UPN), 
where users share connectivity and act as an access point for 
other users. To incentivize user participation in this network, we 
allow the users to trade their data plan and obtain a profit by 
selling and buying leftover data capacities (caps) from each other. 
We formulate the data trading association between buyers and 
sellers as a matching game. In this game, buyers and sellers rank 
each other based on preference functions that capture the buyers’ 
demand for data and QoS requirements, the data available for 
purchase from the sellers and energy resources. We show that 
these preferences are interdependent and influenced by existing 
network-wide matching. For this reason, the game can be 
classified as a one-to-many matching game with externalities. To 
solve the game, we propose a distributed algorithm that combines 
notions from matching theory and market equilibrium. The 
algorithm enables the players to self-organize into a stable 
matching and ensures dynamic adaptation of price to data 
demand and supply. The properties of the resulting matching are 
discussed. We also calculate operator gains and the benchmark 
price that will encourage users to join the UPN. Simulation 
results show that the proposed algorithm yields average utility 
per user improvements of up to 25% and 50% relative to random 
matching and worst case utility, respectively. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing demand for mobile data in current cellular 
networks and the proliferation of advanced handheld devices 
place user-provided networks (UPNs) in a prominent position 
for next-generation network architectures [1], [2]. In UPN, 
users share their connectivity and provide Internet connection 
for others without additional network infrastructure costs. 
Some UPN services rely on fixed access points like FON [3], 
while others are more flexible, and rely on mobile devices 
such as smartphones and portable devices [1], [4]. Several 
UPN business models have recently been implemented by 
different startups and operators [4], [5]. Open Garden [4], for 
instance, enables mobile users to create a mesh network and 
share their Internet connections without the intervention of a 
network operator, while Karma [5], virtual mobile operator, 
enables its subscribers to act as mobile WiFi hotspots (MiFi) to 
serve non-subscribers by offering in return free data. The 
adoption of UPNs by major network operators emphasizes the 
potential of these networks to generate gains for both users and 
operators. However, their success heavily depends on users’ 
willingness to contribute their resources.  
In this paper, we consider an operator-supervised UPN 
where users share their mobile connection and act as access 
points for users in their vicinity. Motivated by the recently 
launched traded data plans [6], where wireless service 
providers (WSP) allow users to sell and buy leftover data 
capacities from each other, we incorporate the concept of data 
plan trading into the UPN as an incentive for users to 
participate in this network. We study and design novel 
strategies for buyer-seller data trading associations, data 
trading price, and pricing mechanisms that will encourage 
users to join the UPN. In our model, we broaden the use of 
UPNs to the following cases: a) if the operator is not able to 
satisfy the users’ QoS requirements, he will encourage them to 
transmit through the UPN in return for compensation; b) if 
users use up their data plan, they can buy additional data 
through the UPN. No additional traffic control measures are 
needed and the operator will receive a profit proportional to 
the amount of data traded in the UPN.  
 Several recent studies proposed incentive mechanisms for 
UPNs motivated by the commercial practices of Open Garden 
[7] and Karma [8]. A scheme based on the Nash bargaining 
solution is presented for an Open Garden-like UPN in [7] to 
incentivize mobile users to share their connectivity and 
resources both fairly and efficiently. In [8] the operator 
determines a free quota reimbursement and data price charged 
to each user to maximize the seller´s revenue in a Karma-like 
UPN. The interaction is modelled as a non-cooperative 
Stackelberg two-stage game. However, these works focus on 
either a fixed network topology [7] or on the iteration of a 
single seller and its buyers [8]. In [1], a dynamic network 
architecture based on the UPN concept is proposed. The 
authors consider the users’ QoS requirements on access point 
selection and provide a set of contracts based on available 
connectivity (wired or wireless). However, they focus on 
centralized social welfare optimization and ignore competition 
between buyers and sellers. 
In this paper, we consider an operator-supervised UPN 
where users can trade their data plan and earn a profit by 
selling and buying leftover data capacities from each other. 
The WSP supervises the trading and ensures that the sellers’ 
trading revenue and the buyers’ purchased data are reflected in 
their bills. We formulate the buyer-seller data trading 
association as a matching game. In this game, buyers and 
sellers need to rank one another based on preference functions 
that capture data demand and QoS requirements in the case of 
buyers and, available data and energy consumption in the case 
of sellers. These preferences are independent and strongly 
influenced by the formation of other buyer-seller links. The 
proposed game can be classified as a many-to-one matching 
game with externalities. To solve this game, a distributed 
algorithm is developed that enables users to self-organize into 
a stable matching; in addition, the optimum trading price is 
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derived from market equilibrium. In such a data market, we are 
interested in answering two key questions: a) how do different 
choices by users affect each other’s decision to join the UPN? 
and, b) how does the price impact that decision?  
We assess the performance of the algorithm using 
simulations and show that it yields significant performance 
gains for all parties involved. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we introduce the system model and in Section III we describe 
the analytical market model for data trading. In Section IV, we 
develop our matching-theory approach to data trading. In 
Section V, we present the numerical results and finally, in 
Section VI we conclude our paper. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An example of a macro-cell data market. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider an uplink transmission in a single macro-cell, 
as depicted in Fig. 1. It is assumed that a monopolistic wireless 
service provider (WSP) charges its subscribers a fixed fee for a 
maximum data volume in a month. The WSP limits excessive 
data usage by charging overage fees per usage exceeding the 
monthly data cap. Besides, leftover data cannot be utilized in 
subsequent months. This hybrid pricing scheme is commonly 
adopted in the cellular service market to control traffic load 
[1], [8]-[9]. For a better utilization of resources, the WSP 
allows its subscribers to sell leftover data caps while acting as 
an access point for other users in their vicinity. Such a network 
is referred to as a UPN. 
We model the behavior of users in the macro-cell data 
market as buyers and sellers. Let  = {1,…, B} and 
= BS {1,…, S} = {0,…, S}  denote the set of all buyers and 
sellers, respectively. The bandwidth allocated to buyer b by 
seller s is denoted by wbs, and the buyer’s transmission power 
is Pb. We consider that sellers use a time-division multiple-
access scheduler in which each time slot has a duration τt. 
Using this uplink transmission system implies that users 
assigned to the same seller do not interfere with each other, 
i.e., there is no intra-access point interference. Note that the 
analysis undertaken in this paper is equally applicable to other 
multiple access and scheduling schemes [10]-[12]. Further, as 
the UPN is enabled by users and interference is difficult to 
predict, we consider that the operator assigns separate macro-
cell channels for the UPN used. In this regard, buyers 
transmitting in adjacent UPNs will interfere with each other.  
Then, the capacity of the link between buyer b and the BS (s 
= 0) is, 
0 0 0 0( ) log(1 )b b b bc w   ,                        (1) 
where 2
0 0 /b b bP h   is the SNR, with hb0 indicating the 
channel gain between buyer b and BS, and σ2 the variance of 
the Gaussian noise.  
Similarly, the capacity between buyer b and seller s, s ≠ 0, is 
given by 
( ) log(1 ),    / 0bs bs bs bsc w s s                    (2) 
where 2/ ( )bs b bs bsP h I    is the SINR with hbs indicating 
the channel gain between buyer b and seller s and σ2 the 
variance of the Gaussian noise. Here, the interference 
component 
' ''bs b b sb b
I P h

 , ' \{ }b b  relates to 
transmissions from other buyers b’ to their respective sellers 
using the same sub-channels, and Pb’ and hb’s denote the 
transmit power and the channel gain between buyer b´ and 
seller s [20].  
Buyers need the resources for a specific contractual period. 
The data volume transmitted on the link between user b and s 
depends on the capacity of the link and contract duration τbs as  
2log (1 )bs bs bs bsQ w    .                         (3) 
If we assume that the BS serves the users within a frame of 
duration Δt, the connectivity availability of the BS is  
                                
0 0t                                          (4) 
where 
0
0 0bN
   and N0 is the number of users connected 
to the BS, each requesting a connectivity duration τb0. We 
consider that Δt is large enough to serve all subscribers.  
Energy cost is a critical parameter for the sellers 
participating in the UPN. The connectivity availability 
duration for a seller s, s ≠ 0, depends on the remaining battery 
duration τb and physical availability τp. Connectivity 
availability is thus  
( , ),  / 0s b s pmin s s                          (5) 
where battery duration depletes, proportionally to γ, with the 
number of users connected to the seller [13]. 
The aims of our model are to encourage buyers to select the 
service (UPN or macro-cell BS) that best satisfies their 
connectivity requirements in order to maximize their utility, 
and at the same time enable the sellers and the operator to 
make a profit. The service duration constraint and traffic 
dynamics are considered to reflect a real network.  The WSP 
acts as a central controller that supervises transactions (e.g., it 
ensures that data purchases and sales are reflected in users’ 
monthly bills).  
III. ANALYTICAL MARKET MODEL FOR DATA TRADING 
Each buyer has certain minimum requirements in terms of 
channel quality and availability of service duration (i.e., γbs ≥ 
γb,min, τbs ≥ τb,min) that a seller must satisfy. We define a 
connectivity parameter to fulfil these minimum requirements, 
        
,min ,min1,    if  and 
 
0,   otherwise         
bs b bs b
bs
   

 
 

.            (6)   
Since users can purchase different data caps from the WSP, 
we denote the initial data caps of buyer b and seller s as i
bQ  
BS 
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UPN 
and i
sQ , respectively. Users do not know exactly how much 
data they will use over the coming month. We denote as e the 
probability that a user will exceed his/her monthly cap. In such 
a case, the user needs to choose between joining the UPN or 
paying an additional fee to buy extra data directly from the 
WSP. Besides, a user may decide to join the UPN even if 
he/she has enough data available (1 – e) but in this case the 
macro-cell transmission cannot provide the required level of 
QoS.  
We assume that users may be interested in buying or selling 
a certain volume of data at a given time during the month. 
Demand for data volume will exist when a potential buyer b 
perceives profit in trading. This profit can be defined as the 
difference between the gain from using the data volume and 
the price paid to the seller for it. 
The utility of the user when transmitting to the macro-cell 
BS (s = 0) is defined as 
0 0 0 0 0( ) [ ( ( ) ) (1 ) ( )]
i i
b b b b b b b b bU Q e f Q Q Q p e f Q       (7) 
where the first term is the utility when the user exceeds the 
initial data plan 
i
bQ  with probability eb and purchases 
additional data volume Qb0 at price p (price per unit of data 
exceeding the data plan). The second term is the utility when 
the user has data available with probability (1 – eb). The 
function f(·) is a non-decreasing concave function with 
decreasing marginal satisfaction. A common example of this 
function is the α-fair utility function [6] 
1
( )
1
Q
f Q





, 
where α ∈ [0,1) and θ > 0 is a scaling factor. We use (θb, αb) to 
denote the parameters for buyers and (θs, αs) sellers. 
The utility of a buyer b when buying traffic volume Qbs from 
seller s, s ≠ 0, is  
    
( ; ) [ ( ( ) )
                       (1 )( ( ) ( ))]
i
bs bs bs bs b b bs bs bs
b bs bs bs
U Q e f Q Q Q
e f Q Q r
  

   
  
         (8) 
where the first term is the utility when the buyer has exceeded 
his data plan 
i
bQ  with probability eb and π is the price per unit 
of data volume traded. The second term is the utility when the 
user has not exceeded his data plan (1 – eb) and r is the reward 
from the WSP for transmitting in the UPN.  
   In response to demand, the BS (s = 0) will obtain a utility:  
                
0 0 0 0 0( ) ( ( ) )
i
b b b b bU Q f Q Q Q p                  (9) 
where Qb0 is the additional data purchased when the buyer 
exceeds the data plan. If the buyer has not exceeded the plan 
then, Qb0 = 0 and the utility will depend only on the initial data 
volume.  
Similarly, a seller s, s ≠ 0, will be willing to sell his/her 
leftover traffic volume in return for a profit. This profit can be 
defined as the gain from serving a number of buyers and the 
revenue earned from selling the resource. Thus, the utility of a 
seller when selling traffic volume Qs is  
   ( ; ) ( ( ) ( ))is sb sb bs s sb sb sbU Q f Q Q Q              (10) 
where i
sQ  is the monthly data volume purchased, π is the price 
per unit data volume in the secondary data market and ξ is the 
energy cost for serving as an AP.  
An example of the buyer-seller data trading association in 
the UPN is shown in Fig. 2, where buyer 1 and 2 select the 
same seller for data trading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of data trading in UPN. 
 
By considering the previous definitions, the buyer 
optimization is as follows  
,
2
maximize    
subject to   log (1 )
bs bs
bs
Q
bs bs bs bs bs
U
Q w

   
            (11) 
where γbs is the SINR on the link between user b and s, τbs is 
the duration of that transmission and πbs is the price for the 
data traded. Buyer b selects the seller who satisfies his/her 
minimum requirements and the data volume sought is 
constrained by the capacity of the link. 
 The seller optimization problem is as follows, 
,
maximize      
subject to    ,  ,  0
                                     
sb sb
sbbQ
i
bs sb sb
sb bs
U
Q Q s s
Q Q

   


              (12) 
where the total data volume sold by seller s, s ≠ 0, 
s bs sbb
Q Q , should not exceed his/her data volume.  
Solving the buyer-seller association using classical 
optimization techniques is an NP-hard problem [1], which 
depends on the number of buyers and sellers in the network. In  
Section IV, a new data trading algorithm is presented to solve 
buyer and seller optimization in a self-organized distributed 
manner. The algorithm combines matching theory to form 
buyer-seller associations and market equilibrium to obtain the 
trading price. The matching of buyers and sellers results in a 
trading matrix T = [tbs] with entries tbs = 1, if buyer b buys data 
from seller s, or 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that the trading 
matrix also defines the topology.  
We define the revenue of the WSP in our data market as, 
0 0 , 0
, 0
[ ( )
        (1 ) ]
w b b b bs bs sb s s
b bs bss s
U e t Q p t Q
e t Q r
 


  

 

          (13) 
where the first term is the revenue obtained when the buyer 
exceeds the data plan, tbs is the optimum matching between b 
and s obtained in Section IV and ν is the proportionality 
coefficient. The second term refers to the reward r that the 
WSP pays to the buyer as an incentive to join the UPN when it 
cannot provide the QoS requirements.   
BS s 
b1 
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Q
2sb
Q
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Q
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Q Q
IV. DATA TRADING AS A MATCHING GAME WITH 
EXTERNALITIES 
In this section, the framework of matching games is used to 
develop a self-organized buyer-seller association algorithm to 
solve the optimization problem while avoiding combinatorial 
complexity [14]. We formulate the problem as a one-to-many 
matching game between buyers and sellers in which each 
buyer can be associated with only one seller, and sellers can 
admit a certain quota of users. Buyers and sellers rank one 
another based on utility functions that capture their 
preferences. These preferences are interdependent and are 
influenced by the existing matching. Hence, the proposed 
game can be classified as a matching game with externalities. 
We formally define the notion of matching: 
 
Definition 1. A matching (or association) η is a function from 
the set  into the set   such that, 
1)  s = η(b) if and only if b = η (s),  
2) | μ(b) | = 1 and | μ(s) | ≤ nab, 
where nab is the number of buyers that can be served by seller s 
with 
i
sQ . 
A preference relation 
b
 for buyer b over the set of sellers 
 is defined as,  
'( , ) ( ', ') ( ) ( ')b bs bss s U U     .               (14) 
where sellers s, s’ ∈ , s ≠ s’, and s = η(b), s’ = η’(b). 
Analogously, a preference relation 
s
 for seller s over the set 
of buyers  is defined as,  
'( , ) ( ', ') ( ) ( ')s sb sbb b U U     .              (15) 
where buyers b, b’ ∈ , b ≠ b’ and b = η(s), b’ = η’(s). 
A. Buyer and Seller Preferences  
We define the existence of a link between buyer b and seller 
s by variable tbs;η = {tbs | η, tbs ≤ βbs } conditioned on the current 
matching η and QoS requirements. The aim of each buyer 
(seller) is to maximize his/her own utility, or equivalently, to 
become associated with the most preferred seller (buyer). 
The buyer and seller utilities given in (7)-(10) are redefined 
below to include their connectivity constraints in the utility 
function by applying the penalty function method with 
2
0,  0,  log (1 )
;  
1,   otherwise 1,   otherwise
bs sb osbs bs bs bs bs b
bs bs
Q QQ w   
 
   
  
 

 Then, the modified buyer utility is 
( ; , ) ( ; )b bs bs bs b bs bs bsU Q t U Q                   (16) 
where κ is the penalty factor, κ ≥ 0. If the buyer data demand 
violates the connectivity constraint, the penalty term κ will 
reduce the data requested.  
Similarly, the modified seller utility is 
( ; , ) ( ; )s sb sb bs s sb sb bsbU Q t U Q              (17)   
where ρ is the penalty factor for the seller, ρ ≥  0. If the data 
volume offered by the seller exceeds his/her overall data cap, 
the penalty term ρ will reduce the data offered.  
B. Proposed solution 
Given the formulated data trading game, our goal is to find 
a stable matching, which is one of the key solution concepts of 
matching theory. Due to these externalities, the traditional 
solutions based on the deferred acceptance algorithm used in 
[14] are unsuitable since the ranking of preferences changes as 
the matching forms. Thus, we look at a new stability concept 
based on the idea of swap matching [15], [19] and extend it to 
define seller-swap and service-swap in our data trading 
market. Then, the optimum price for the data traded in such a 
matching scenario is obtained. 
 
Definition 2. Given a matching η, a pair of buyers b, b’ ∈ 
and sellers s, s’ ∈  where  (b, s), (b’, s’) ∈ η, a seller-swap 
is defined as  ' \ ( , ) ( , ')
b
ss b s b s   .  
Definition 3. A service-swap is a seller-swap where seller s, s’ 
∈  with s or s’ = 0.  
A matching is stable if there are no swap matchings (i.e., 
seller-swap or service-swap) 
'
b
ss , such that: 
    
 
 
'
'
, ( ),
, ( ),
  , ', , ' ,  ( ) ( )  and
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b
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b
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x xx
x b b s s U U
x b b s s U U
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
 
 
   
   
  
A matching η is said to be stable if there is no buyer b’ or 
seller s’, for which ( ', ') ( , )sb b  , or ( ', ') ( , )bs s  . 
The stability is reached by guaranteeing that swaps only occur 
if all members involved will improve their utilities. And thus, 
the order of preferences for each player not involved in the 
swap will be unaltered.  
To solve the formulated matching game, we propose a novel 
distributed algorithm for data trading (Algorithm 1) that 
enables the players to self-organize into a stable matching that 
guarantees the required QoS. The proposed algorithm consists 
of two main stages. Stage 1 focuses on buyer and seller 
discovery, association and swap-matching evaluation, and 
Stage 2 determines the data trading price. 
First, we assume an initial price for the data πbs(0) that will 
be updated later on based on data demand and supply. The 
next stage is to form buyer-seller associations comprising a 
seller and a set of buyers. Each buyer selects a set of sellers 
that satisfy his/her QoS requirements and sorts them in 
decreasing order according to their respective utility function 
in (16). The buyer then selects the top utility-providing sellers, 
denoted by set b. Similarly, each seller s ∈ b may also be 
selected by a set of buyers. Using the same selection process, 
the seller accepts the top utility-providing buyers denoted by 
s according to their utility in (17). However, because of 
externalities the order of the buyers’ preferences may have 
changed since the seller selection. Based on the current 
matching η, buyers and sellers update their utilities and 
preferences over one another and perform service-swap and 
seller-swap until a stable matching is found. Next, we 
determine the equilibrium price for each UPN by market 
equilibrium [16]. 
The data demand and supply functions for each UPN are 
obtained by differentiating the utilities in (16) and (17) with 
respect to Qbs and Qsb, respectively, 
 
1/ 1/
(1 )
b b
ib b
b bs b b b
bs bs bs bs
Q e Q e
r
 
 
   
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   (18) 
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i s
s sb s
bs bs
Q Q


  
 
    
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                     (19) 
 
where (θb, αb) and (θs, αs) denote the parameters for buyers and 
sellers in the utility f(·), respectively and κ and ρ are the 
penalty term for the buyer and seller, respectively. 
The total data demand and supply for a particular seller at 
equilibrium is 
s b
b sb s 
  . Then, the equilibrium 
price is derived iteratively using the following equation,  
 
 ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
s b
bs bs s b sb s
t t t t  
 
        (20) 
 
where the price in the next iteration is the difference between 
demand and supply at time t, weighted by the learning rate σ 
and added to the price in the current iteration. A positive value 
of ( ) ( )b sb st t   indicates that there is more demand, 
i.e., there is a shortage of data volume, and thus the price 
increases. Alternatively, if supply is greater than demand, the 
price will decrease. This process is repeated until the price 
difference |π (t + 1) – π (t)| is less than a threshold. The stability 
of the solution depends on the learning rate σs, which is 
analyzed in the sequel. This process is repeated for every 
buyer b giving rise to the optimum price *
bs  and the matching 
of buyers and sellers T*. 
For the practical implementation of the algorithm, 
communication between buyers and sellers is required only for 
trading and this can be done through the common control 
channel. The operator supervises the trading and ensures that 
the transactions are reflected in the buyers’ and sellers’ 
monthly bills. This will be done automatically by software in 
the terminals. 
 
Theorem 1. The proposed Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to 
reach a stable matching and a data trading price. 
 
Proof.  Given the limited transmission range and available 
data at the seller, the number of alternatives for both buyers 
and sellers is finite. Besides, only swaps that improve all 
players’ utility will occur. Once the stable matching is formed, 
the pricing algorithm converges to a stable price as in [16]. 
The stability of the pricing algorithm depends mainly on the 
learning rate. The most common way to analyze stability is to 
consider the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the pricing 
function in (20). Following [16], the fixed point πbs is stable if 
and only if,  
1
1 1/ 1 1/
1 1
0
b s
b s
s
b b bs s s bs
 
 

     

     
           
           (21) 
where (θb, αb) and (θs, αs) denote the parameters for buyers and 
sellers in the utility f(·). 
 
  
Algorithm 1 Dynamic Data Trading  
1: Initialize the price πbs(0)  
Stage 1 – Formation of buyer-seller associations  
2: Each buyer b chooses a set of sellers b following 
b
 as in (16): 
 1 ...b b bkU U    
3: Each seller s selects a set of buyers s following s as in (17) 
4: repeat  
5:   Obtain ( )bU   and ( )sU   for the current matching η and update b 
6:    
' ( ', ) ( , ) 
b
ss bs s if then
  
7:       Buyer b sends a proposal to seller s’ 
8:       Seller s’ computes 
' '( )
b
s b ssU   for the swap matching '
b
ss   
9:       
' ' ( , ) ( , ) 
b
ss sb b if then
  
10:           s’ ← s’  {b} ;  
11:           
'
b
ss   
14:      end 
15:   end 
16:   Stage 2 – Data trading price 
17:   for each buyer b in the current matching: 
18:      for each s ∈ b: 
19:        Obtain marginal data demand (18) and supply (19) 
20:        Calculate learning rate σs using (21) 
21:        Obtain price πbs(t + 1) using (20) 
22:        while | πbs(t + 1)  − πbs(t) | > ε do 
23:             Update data demand (18) and supply (19) 
24:             t = t + 1 
25:             Calculate learning rate σs using (21) 
26:             Update price πbs(t + 1) using (20) 
27:        end  
28:     end 
29:   end 
30: 
' ' ' '  : ( ', ) ( , ) and ( , ) ( , )
b b b
ss ss b ss ss s b b    until   
31:  Select seller s for data trading at price π*bs 
32: Optimum trading matrix T* is obtained 
 
 
Table 1. Price benchmark for UPN service 
 ψb0 = 0, ψbs = 0 ψb0 = 1, ψbs = 0 ψb0 = 0, ψbs = 1 ψb0 = 1, ψbs = 1 
eb = 1 π < p π < p – κ0/Qb π < p – κs /Qb 
π < p – χ/Qb 
– κ0/Qb 
1–eb=1 
π < (f(Qb) + 
rQb – f(Qb
i))/Qb 
π < (f(Qb) + rQb – 
f(Qb
i))/Qb – κ0/Qb 
π < (f(Qb) + rQb – 
f(Qb
i))/Qb – κs/Qb 
π < (f(Qb) + rQb 
– f(Qb
i))/Qb – 
κ0/Qb – κs/Qb 
 
C. Price Benchmark for UPN service 
Following the model from Section III, we derive the price 
conditions under which a service-swap will occur. Let us 
assume that the user requests the same amount of data in the 
macro-cell and the UPN, 
bQ . The user will prefer to transmit 
in the UPN if Ubs > Ub0, which occurs when 
0 0
( ) ( )
(1 )
i
b b b b s bs
b b
b b
f Q rQ f Q
e e p
Q Q
   

          (22) 
where κ0 and κs are the penalty factor for violating the 
connectivity constraint in the macro-cell and the UPN, ψb0 and 
ψbs, respectively, as explained in Section IV.A. Depending on 
the service and data availability, different price benchmarks 
are obtained for the UPN service, as shown in Table 1.  
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       Fig. 3. Comparison of the average utility per buyer.                Fig. 4. Average utility per buyer.                                Fig. 5. Average utility per seller. 
 
 
 
 
If the user exceeds the data plan (eb = 1) and both the 
macro-cell and UPN service satisfy the required QoS, the user 
will choose UPN if π < p. If the macro-cell service does not 
provide the required QoS, the benchmark price to connect to 
UPN is π < p – κ0/Qb, where there is a penalty discount. The 
same penalty is assumed for the UPN. Similarly, if the UPN 
does not provide the required QoS, the price is π < p – κs/Qb 
where χ is the penalty in the UPN. The same analysis can be 
applied when the user does not exceed the data plan (1 – eb = 1).  
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We consider a single macro-cell network deployed in a 
square area of 1000 x 1000 m with the BS at the center. The 
buyers and sellers are randomly placed in the network. We set 
all users’ transmit power to 20 mW, the noise level to σ2 = 10-7 
W/Hz and the propagation loss to α = 3. We assume that 
buyers and sellers have a monthly contract for a data volume 
of 10 GB. The minimum SINR requirement varies between [1, 
20] dB and the duration of connectivity varies between [0, 15] 
minutes. The energy consumption ξ is set to 0.257 J/MB as 
estimated in [17] for 4G connection. The data usage price 
depends on the country, the data plan and the service provider. 
Based on a recent ITU publication [18], we set the price of a 
10GB data plan to 10€, and the price per GB traded in UPN 
between 0.1 and 1€. The results are averaged over 1000 runs. 
 Figure 3 shows the average utility per buyer obtained for a 
network with 10 sellers and 20 buyers, where the probability 
of exceeding the data plan is eb =0.8. The results are presented 
with respect to the transmission range, which varies from 20 to 
200 m; this corresponds to a minimum SINR of 20 dB to 1dB 
in the same range. The performance is compared with random 
matching and worst case utility. The latter refers to the 
matching that provides the lowest buyer´s utility. Note that 
these schemes were selected for comparison purposes since, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the 
association problem for data trading in UPNs. Fig. 3 shows 
that, as the transmission range increases and with it the options 
to connect, our proposed scheme yields a performance 
advantage of 25% in terms of utility improvement relative to 
random match and 50% to worst case utility. Similar gains 
were observed in seller utility but the results are omitted due to 
space limitations. Buyer utility, by contrast, decreases with 
transmission range as the SINR is lower. 
 Figures 4 and 5 present the average utility per buyer and 
seller, respectively, for different values of the probability of 
exceeding the data plan, eb. As before, we assume 10 sellers 
and 20 buyers. We can see that, as eb increases, the utility for 
buyers and sellers decreases. This is because buyers need to 
pay extra for the additional data exceeding the data plan. 
Therefore, the amount of data requested is significantly lower 
than the initial data plan. The average volume of data traded 
per UPN in this scenario varied between 0.5 and 2 GB. It is 
worth noting that seller utility increases with transmission 
range as the number of potential buyers increases. 
 Figure 6 shows the average number of buyers transmitting 
to the macro-cell BS, as the number of buyers B increases and 
the number of sellers remains constant to S = 10. For high eb 
values, the number of users transmitting to the BS decreases 
and buyers prefer to join the UPN to purchase additional data. 
Furthermore, if price p in the macro-cell increases with respect 
to the price in the UPN π, an additional decrease in number of 
users is observed in the macro-cell. In particular, when price p 
doubles, the number of users transmitting to the BS decreases 
by about 25%. 
Figure 7 shows the revenue of the operator obtained in the 
UPN and BS operation. We can see that the UPN yields higher 
revenue to the operator than the BS as a higher volume of data 
is transmitted through the UPN. The revenue reaches 200% 
when users have high QoS requirements (low transmission 
range). 
Figure 8 shows the number of iterations needed for 
convergence of the data trading algorithm in stages 1 and 2 as 
B varies. Note how the number of iterations increases for 
medium-size networks, B ≤ 50, and remains constant for B > 
50. This is because as density increases, adjacent sellers will 
offer similar performance levels and thus, the number of swaps 
will decrease. It is worth noting that the convergence of stage 2 
is influenced by price initialization. If the price is initialized to 
the global market price, which is obtained as in (20) 
considering the total data demand and supply in the network, 
the number of iterations is significantly reduced. This price 
could be provided by the operator as a reference price for data 
trading. Still, the algorithm presents a reasonable convergence 
time even in very dense networks. 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Number of buyers tx. to BS;  Fig. 7. Operator revenue in UPN and BS; Fig. 8. Average number of algorithm iterations; Fig. 9. Demand and supply in UPN. 
      
 
 
 
 
The equilibrium price in the UPN is presented in Figure 9 as 
a function of data demand and supply. Each pair of curves 
represents the demand and supply in a UPN consisting of nb 
and ns potential buyers and sellers, respectively. The 
considered pricing scheme based on market equilibrium 
adjusts the price based on the data demand and supply. The 
equilibrium price is obtained when these are equal. When the 
demand, nb, increases for a constant supply, ns, the price 
increases accordingly. This pricing scheme controls and 
incentivizes the demand for data in the UPN.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have proposed an analytical market model 
for data trading in a UPN that captures the preferences and 
connectivity requirements of buyers, sellers and macro-cell 
BSs. We have formulated the buyer-seller association problem 
for data trading as a matching game in which buyers, sellers 
and BSs rank each other according to their preferences, and in 
which, the trading price is governed by market equilibrium. In 
this game, preferences are interdependent and influenced by 
matchings that arise. To solve the game, we have developed a 
distributed algorithm that accounts for network externalities. 
We have shown that, with the proposed algorithm, buyers, 
sellers and BSs reach a stable matching in a reasonable number 
of iterations. Our simulation results showed that the proposed 
approach can provide significant gains in terms of utility, with 
gains of up to 25% observed relative to random matching and 
up to 50% relative to worst case utility. Significant gains were 
also observed for the operator. We also analyzed the properties 
of the stable associations. 
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